Regional systemic change
by Asher Susser

Israeli-Turkish relations have gone through a difficult period recently. A longer-term historical view of regional systemic change may serve to place the present-day relationship in perspective and explain much of its content.

In the last quarter of a century, the Arab states have for the most part entered a prolonged period of socio-economic stagnation and concomitant political lethargy and disarray. In the Middle East of today, it is the non-Arab states of Turkey, Iran, and Israel and external players like the United States that set the regional agenda more than the Arabs do. The US is the sole superpower, while Israel, Turkey, and Iran all project extraordinary regional, military, economic, or geopolitical might that the Arabs at present cannot match. In circumstances such as these, with Iran on the rise and the Arabs in decline, relations between Israel and Turkey are absolutely critical for both states and for Middle Eastern stability.

During this same period Israel has made peace with Egypt and Jordan. It has withdrawn unilaterally from Lebanon, and the Syrian-Israeli frontier is governed by a stable disengagement agreement signed 30 years ago. If one adds the US occupation of Iraq to this strategic equation, Israel, for the first time ever, has no serious concern of an activated eastern front. Armed engagement is presently restricted almost solely to the Israeli-Palestinian domain, which has little chance of provoking a wider regional conflagration. These developments have vitally important strategic ramifications for the Israeli-Turkish relationship.

Israel no longer has any self-interest in the promotion of Kurdish independence. Thirty or 40 years ago, when the interstate Arab-Israel conflict was at its height and Israel feared an eastern front that could couple with Egypt for a major Arab offensive, Israel also had a vested interest in the undermining of Iraqi integrity. In the Middle East of today, the opposite is true. For Israel, its friendship with Turkey is immeasurably more important than any additional weakening of Iraq.

Furthermore, a Balkanized Iraq with a weak Shi'ite statelet dominated by Iran could extend Iranian influence deep into the Fertile Crescent, up to Jordan's eastern border, hardly a welcome thought for Israel. It is therefore extremely hard to believe that Israel is presently engaged in the revival of a Kurdish policy that makes no strategic sense, in a completely different regional environment. Israel has flatly denied all the reports in this vein, but Turkish sensitivities have been aroused nonetheless.

The Kurdish question aggravates the sensibilities of Turks of all political persuasions, from the religio-conservatives to the ultra-secular Kemalist republicans. But while Israel developed a remarkable intimacy with the guardians of the secular order in the Turkish military, security establishment, and intelligentsia, it has yet to develop a similar rapport with the new religio-conservative elite of the Justice and Development Party that came to power in November 2002.

The successors of the Kemalist and Zionist revolutions were ideological birds of a feather that naturally flocked together. These historical movements that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to secularize, modernize, and westernize two traditional peoples, the Turks and the Jews, produced secular intellectual and political elites that had an unusually profound meeting of minds. This level of intimacy does not exist with the new ruling elite in Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's political roots are in the Islamist Welfare Party, rather than in the Kemalist republican core. Erdogan, for whom Turkey's Islamic hinterland is more important culturally, emotionally, and politically than it was for his predecessors in government, has been exceptionally critical of Israel and the conduct of its military in the war with Palestinians. So have the media and the public at large, especially the constituencies of Erdogan's popular support.

Suspicion of Israel on the Kurdish issue and criticism of its military are a function of eroded mutual trust. It is imperative in these new circumstances for Israel to clear the air with Turkey and to establish channels of communication with the new elite, not instead of the existing web of connections with the secular elite, but in addition. This is especially so as Turkey edges closer to the European Union.

As Turkey seeks accession to the EU, the accelerated liberalization of its political system is further reducing the role of the military and the security establishment in Turkish politics--a trend that will no doubt continue if and when negotiations begin in earnest for Turkey's accession. The elite with whom Israel's ties were so secure may decline further in political stature. This is all the more reason for Israel to invest an extra effort in creating a relationship of mutual trust and understanding with the new ruling elite as well. Since it is in Israel's own self interest to see Turkey join the EU, Israel will continue to support the Turkish bid for membership.

In so many ways, Israel and Turkey are in the same boat. They are non-Arab Middle Eastern powers and relatively powerful non-Christian neighbors of the EU, with a complicated network of troubled historical, cultural, and political ties to the peoples of Europe. Long persecuted by Europeans, the Jews were always well received by the Turks, who were never party to European Judeo-phobia. Turkey's accession to the EU would be the dilution of the Christian club of Europe, and may just set the stage for Israel's accession at some time in the future.

The key to Israel's relations with Turkey today is trust and new channels of communication. One may hope that the recent visit to Ankara by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will be the first of many such steps, in both directions, to pave the way for a routine of political coordination at the highest level.

Published 22/7/2004 © bitterlemons-international.org

Professor Asher Susser is the director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University.