A Decade of Jordanian Israeli Peace
(Lecture, Tel Aviv University, 26 October 2004)
Prof. Asher Susser

The Israeli Jordanian relationship is a complicated one, no doubt. It always has been. One can choose to emphasize the half empty rather than the half full part of the glass, in assessing the recent decade of peace. But it would not be unreasonable to argue that, whatever the difficulties and disappointments on both sides, we may safely assume that there will also be a 20th anniversary to Jordanian-Israeli peace. The interests that link Israel and Jordan in the preservation of regional security and stability override the deep disappointment that the Jordanians tend to express about the fruits of peace. Even a cursory perusal of Jordanian statements shows that there is no question about the interest that Jordan has in the peace with Israel, as a strategic, historical choice from which there will be no return. It would take an enormous amount of regional convulsion to alter that fundamental assessment.
In discussing Israel and Jordan and the peace process, there are two factors that are elementary to an analysis of Jordan’s place in the region. One is Jordan’s geopolitical centrality. The other is the fact that Jordan does not, and cannot, shape the regional context in which it operates. Jordan is a state whose survivability and stability is consistently underestimated even though Jordan is the most stable state in the Middle East, and is the only country in this part of the world that has the same regime today as it had when established in March 1921. The record speaks for itself. Jordan’s geopolitical centrality is one of the key explanations for this amazing record of continuity. Because Jordan is situated between Israel and the Palestinians to the West and Iraq to the East, between Saudi Arabia in the South and Syria in the North, there are rarely players at any given time who have an interest in Jordan’s demise, while there are always many players, in the region and without, who have a vested interest in Jordan’s continued stability as a regional stabilizer and shock absorber. Jordan, therefore, is far more important than its size or relative power would suggest.
On the other hand, however, Jordan cannot shape the regional context in which it has to function. It is not powerful enough to do so, and, thus, the regional context is constantly shaped by others, forcing Jordan to adapt accordingly. At times it was Abd al-Nasir, these days it often seems to be the Americans. There were other Arab players in the past and, of course, the British, in the days of Empire. Though Jordan is not a regional trend setter, Jordanian Kings, Abdullah I, then Hussein and now Abdullah II, have become past masters in the dexterous management of changing regional contexts and circumstances. They have all done that extremely well, including Abdullah II, though there were many who initially questioned his capacity to do so.
The regional context that produced the atmosphere for Israeli Jordanian peace has changed in the last decade, and has deeply influenced the measure of success that the Jordanians attach to the peace treaty. In the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-91, Jordan’s Arab hinterland and strategic depth, Iraq, had been shattered. The Jordanians found themselves in a predicament of strategic vulnerability while still in the depths of a profound economic crisis, which had begun shortly before the war and was further exacerbated by the war and its regional ramifications.
After a difficult patch in its relationship with the US over Iraq, when King Hussein did not support the Americans against Saddam Hussein, Jordan shifted back into the US sphere of influence, which, at that time, also meant making peace with Israel. Making peace with Israel had become a Jordanian strategic need, all the more after the Palestinians had already signed the Oslo accords in September 1993. That explains much of the timing of 1994: geo-strategic and economic constraints that propelled the Jordanians to opt for a full peace treaty with Israel. Above and beyond the treaty and its inherent benefits, Jordan required two more regional changes – one, that Iraq would become a restrained, solid and stable state with whom Jordan could resume trade and build up its economy, which rested heavily on trade with Iraq; and on the Israeli-Palestinian flank – the emergence of an independent Palestinian state.
The existence of an independent Palestinian state had become a Jordanian self-interest. From the mid eighties onwards, Jordan had developed an interest in the establishment of a Palestinian state, to make sure that all and sundry understood that Palestine was in the West Bank, and not on the East Bank: that Palestine was in Palestine and that Jordan was not Palestine. There is an impression that some Israelis still have, that the Jordanians are opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state. That used to be Jordanian policy, but has changed with time. Jordan’s need for the creation of Palestinian state was also a function of Jordan’s state interests in the Palestinian question. All the matters of final status that are to be negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians, in one way or another, impinge upon Jordanian national security or Jordanian historical interests.
There are four issues of final status: borders, settlements, Jerusalem and refugees. It is particularly the last that is a major Jordanian concern. The fate of the Palestinian refugees, so many of whom are Jordanian citizens, cannot really be negotiated without involving the Jordanians. The Jordanians would even argue that the Jordanian state should be compensated for hosting the refugees for more than half a century. Certainly under King Hussein, and less so under King Abdullah II, Jordan believed that it was the historical right of the Hashemite dynasty to have a special say over the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem. In the peace treaty with Israel Jordan’s special status in Jerusalem is indeed specifically recognized. Even talking about borders and settlements in the Israeli-Palestinian track has a close connection with Jordan. Borders and settlements relate to the manner in which the demographic balance would finally be set in the West Bank. This the Jordanians watch with great anxiety, in fear that if too many Israeli settlements remain, one day there might not be enough place for the Palestinians, who will then be forced out.
Thus, in Jordanian-Israeli peace making, it was regional, strategic matters that relate to third parties, such as the Palestinians or Iraq, which took priority over purely bilateral issues. In the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty there are no bilateral security arrangements, no early warning stations, no UN forces and no demilitarized zones. That could not possibly have even been imagined in the Israeli-Egyptian treaty or in an Israeli-Syrian treaty.
The treaty was to be a strategic platform for common understanding on two regional matters. One was the Palestinian issue, the other was Iraq. Iraq was not mentioned by name in the treaty, but there is “the Iraqi clause”, where Israel and Jordan agree that both states will not allow the stationing of potentially hostile foreign forces on their soil. That is to insure Israel against the stationing of Iraqi forces in Jordan, no longer that much of an issue, but in 1994, it was. Jordan, for its part, on the Palestinian front, wanted Israel to commit itself, not to allow the involuntary movement of population. In other words, to assure the Jordanians that there would be no transfer of Palestinians to Jordan. Prime Minister Abd al Salam Majali noted at the time that, at long last, Jordan could say with relief that the notion that “Jordan is Palestine” has finally been put to rest.
On the economic front Jordan hoped that the peace with Israel would extricate the kingdom from its economic woes. This was an unrealistic expectation from the outset, but the Jordanian have since complained that they have yet to benefit from the fruits of peace. This is not an entirely justifiable complaint. After all Jordan’s economy of late is doing much better, as exports to the US alone are in the vicinity of one billion dollars a year. That is the highest export figure that Jordan has ever had to any country at any time. The US was not a market for Jordanian goods in the past, and the reorientation of the Jordanian economy in the last few years is closely related to the treaty with Israel.
Jordan’s economic improvement in part has nothing to do with Israel but in part it does have a lot to do with Israel, certainly in reference to trade with the US. Exports to the US are primarily from the Qualified Industrial Zone that was established in Jordan by Israeli manufacturers and are facilitated by the Free Trade Agreement between the US and Jordan, which would not have come into being had it not been for the treaty with Israel. Jordan still has enormous economic problems. There is very widespread unemployment and Jordan’s problems are far from over. But there is a real change in the economic trend, at least in part thanks to the peace with Israel, which does not receive the recognition it should in Jordan, from the Monarchy down to the man in the street. The benefits to the economy tend to be overshadowed by the regional politics of uncertainty
Even a cursory glance at the strategic, geopolitical context of today would reveal that, contrary to their expectations, the Jordanians do not have a stable Iraq on the one flank and the state of Palestine on the other. Rather Jordan finds itself locked between two arenas of total chaos: one in Iraq and the other in the West Bank. This is cause for Jordanian strategic anxiety. Wherever they look, eastward or westward, it is chaos that prevails.
The changing regional environment post Iraq is not entirely a blessing for either Israel or Jordan. The demise of Iraq also means the rising influence of Iran and one can readily see the contours of Iranian influence from Tehran to Baghdad, from there to Lebanon, and via Hizballah to Fatah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza--an unprecedented arc of Iranian influence into the very heart of the Arab East. This is not a positive development for Israel nor for Jordan. A Shiite Iraq on one side and a disintegrating West Bank on the other, are hardly attractive neighbors, looking at the region from Amman.
As it was a Palestinian state that the Jordanians had in mind, to make it absolutely clear that “Jordan was Jordan and Palestine was Palestine”, King Hussein disengaged from the West Bank in July 1988. Now it is the Israelis who are going through the motions of disengagement from Palestine, with a similar objective in mind—to make it clear that “Israel is Israel and Palestine is Palestine”. Historically, these moves are not unrelated. In 1948 there was enough common interest between Israel and Jordan for the two to try and protect themselves by absorbing Palestine between them. They both failed, and now, again to protect themselves, they are both disengaging. Israel and Jordan therefore find themselves doing what they attempted to do in 1948, motivated once more by similar reasons, but the policy choice they have both made is diametrically opposed to that chosen in 1948. The Jordanians, however, understood the need to do this about face a lot faster than the Israelis.
But, if Israel is disengaging from Gaza, and if that also means an eventual Israeli disengagement from much of the West Bank, the Jordanians and the Palestinians are going to have to contemplate the future relationship between the West Bank and Jordan. This is not a revival of the Jordanian option of any kind but is simply the recognition of a geopolitical reality. The West Bank is sandwiched between Israel and Jordan. Therefore, the less the West Bank is connected to Israel, the more it will have to look to the Arab hinterland, which is Jordan. There is no one else out there. This is a simple fact of life.
All the same, as Israel plans disengagement and continues to build its security fence, so the old Jordanian fears that preceded the peace treaty, that the Kingdom might be exposed to the dangers of massive Palestinian migration, are exacerbated as a result of the hardships caused by Israel’s actions to the Palestinians, whether intentional or not. So when the Jordanians sum up the strategic environment in 2004 in comparison to 1994, neither on Iraq nor on Palestine, have their strategic needs been addressed.
But, no one of authority in Jordan, neither in the Palace nor in the Government, questions the fundamental strategic interest in maintaining peace with Israel. After all, in this ocean of regional chaos, the peace treaty with Israel is one of the few rocks of stability. It is hardly likely, in these circumstances, that the Jordanians would opt for disruption. It is equally unlikely for Israel to seek such an outcome. Quite the contrary is true. Israel and Jordan have a common interest in preserving the peace more than ever. But as long as the Jordanians continue to see the daily footage of pictures from the West Bank and Iraq, which in the minds of many in Jordan are welded together as part of one reality, this will not be the time for them to engage in normalization and warm peace. We may just have to settle for peace in our time and for normalization and warm peace later.