Prof. Şule Kut, November 6, 2002

Having taken place only a couple of days ago, it is difficult to interpret the results of the Turkish elections.  Pre-election polls turned out to be quite accurate; but still, the results were surprising. The election campaign itself was very dull, lacking any real excitement. However, that changed completely once the ballots were opened.

Eighteen political parties ran in the elections; only two of them, both newcomers, attained seats in the parliament. All five political parties that dominated the previous parliament are now out, and some of their leaders have declared that they will be withdrawing entirely from politics.

Thirty-five per cent of Turkish voters voted for Mr. Erdoğan who is the rightful leader of the Justice and Development Party. (Legally speaking, he is not the head because he was convicted of engaging in incitement to hatred in violation of penal law, however unfair this is, politically. At the same time, the constitution does not really clarify or nullify the court’s decision.)

Here are some facts and figures to help make further sense out of this situation, which is quite an interesting one not only for Turkey, but also for  Israel, which is a friend of Turkey and has been watching its elections very carefully. The results are also a good case study for any comparative politics textbook: there were 45 million potential  voters, 42 million registered voters, and only 32 million actual voters. In other words,the thirty-five per cent that  this new party got is actually 25 per cent of the Turkish electorate, or to put it another way,  75% of the Turkish electorate did not vote for the Justice and Development Party. This is one fact that Tayyp Erdoğan, the party leader, knows so very well, so he is being careful in his speeches - and it's not only for diplomatic purposes or political purposes, but he really feels that the Turkish public is not fully behind him.  But on the other hand it is interesting to note that, to the surprise of many, the Turkish public reacted quite positively to his party’s success, and the public and Erdoğan seem to have formed what the Americans call a 'mutual admiration society'.

Another important result  for Turkish society and Turkish politics is that the two surviving parties can be classified as center-right and center-left, respectively.  The connotation of these terms is similar in Israel and Turkey.  Talk about the need for unification of the numerous diverse parties and groups into two large blocs goes back many decades. Establishing a stable democracy, it was argued, required such a step. However, up until now, achieving it was deemed impossible, as the political scene was becoming more diversified every day.  And now, the old wish for a two party system seems to have been realized. Sixteen political parties, five of which were large, veteran parties, are now out of parliament.

For many Turkish citizens, the election was a great success, if only for its cleansing effect. They have had enough of old leaders, old discourses etc., and it was they, and not an unnatural cause or a freak of nature, which brought about this far-reaching change, through the ballot box. This is something to be proud of.  In other words the Turkish political system is a mature one, and Turkish voters have certainly matured after so many general and local elections.  We in Turkey knew this for some time, although outside observers generally did not.

Will anything change in Turkey-Israel relations, or is anything likely to change in Turkish foreign policy in general under this new governing party?  After all, it is regarded as an Islamist party, even though they constantly emphasize that they are not Islamist, but that they are a conservative democratic party, aspiring, I think, to be the Turkish counterpart of the Christian Democratic parties in Europe. Will this party change anything in Turkish policies or Turkey’s overall orientation? It seems doubtful.

First, Turkey's European Union aspiration will not change. The PJD government actually has a better chance to develop relations with the European Union than many others - and one reason is that Erdoğan is most probably going to play his cards carefully and he is going to invest much effort in Turkey’s democratization.  Therefore, tensions between Europe and Turkey will probably lessen.  In addition, European leaders, while not responding very enthusiastically to what was happening in Turkey, will most likely support the new Turkish government because this will hopefully be a stable government, and not overly confident either.  The EU factor, then, will contribute to a situation in which the government will be moderate, and seek to implement incremental changes, only.

At the same time, there is not going to be much foreign policy change.  To paraphrase the sentence on the Middle East and the Middle East conflict from the PJD’s election declaration: it says that, regardless of religion and race, the party - which has been portrayed by so many as an Islamist  or religious party - supports a just solution to the Middle East problem. Hence, one should not expect much change in Israeli-Turkish relations.

Regarding the Turkish military’s reaction, it is mature enough not to stick its nose into political affairs as long as Erdoğan's party proves to be mature, democratic, responsible and politically fair.  Obviously, these elections reflect the free will of the Turkish voters. At the same time, Turkish voters, 59% of the registered voters were unable to transform their preferences into elected representatives. Together, the ruling party and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), received a minority of the total votes cast, even while winning 98 per cent of the total seats in  parliament, 550.  The public at large may continue to like what Erdoğan has to offer to Turkish society but in reality, most of the public is now in the “opposition,” so to speak.